WITA’s Friday Exchange Podcast: Intractable or Inevitable – Reaching a Trade Deal with India
This week on WITA’s Friday Exchange, former trade negotiators turn their focus towards the world’s most populous country, India, where trade frictions have defined the relationship for generations. Guests discuss the geopolitical complexities of trade with India, tariff and non-tariff barriers, and key issues such as agriculture and digital trade.
Featured Speakers:
Dawn Shackleford, President at Looking Glass Trade, LLC; former Executive Director for Trade Agreements Policy & Negotiations, Department of Commerce; former Assistant USTR for WTO & Multilateral Affairs; and former Deputy Assistant USTR for India, Nepal, and Bhutan, among other positions.
Mark Linscott, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for South and Central Asia/WTO and Multilateral, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Sharon Bomer Lauritsen, Agricultural Trade Consultant, AgTrade Strategies; former Assistant USTR for Agricultural Affairs
Moderator: Joe Damond, Chair of International Trade Policy and Global Life Sciences, Crowell Global Advisors; former Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Asia and Pacific, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Watch the Video on YouTube | Listen on Spotify or Apple Podcasts
Recorded at 1:02 PM ET on 10/2/2025 | WITA
Beyond the Dragon’s Grip: A Strategic Rebalancing of EU-China Relations
Europe’s energy dependency on Russia was neither unforeseeable nor unremarked. For years, warnings circulated from policy experts, frontline Member States, and transatlantic allies about the dangers of relying on a single, authoritarian supplier for critical energy needs. Yet those warnings were dismissed or downplayed, sacrificed at the altar of economic eciency and diplomatic convenience. When the crisis finally came – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – the cost of complacency was immediate and severe: soaring prices, supply disruptions, and a race against time to rebuild an energy architecture that had been left strategically hollow.
This moment should have marked more than an energy reckoning. It should have triggered a broader reassessment of Europe’s structural vulnerabilities – particularly its deepening dependence on China. From critical raw materials and clean energy technologies to pharmaceuticals, digital infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing, China has become an indispensable – yet increasingly unreliable – pillar of the European economy. In many sectors, there is no fallback. There is no redundancy. And there is no clear strategy to change that.
The risks are not speculative. China has shown a growing willingness to weaponise interdependence, using trade barriers, export controls, and targeted retaliation as instruments of geopolitical coercion. Its control over vital technologies and inputs – rare earths, batteries, solar panels, and semiconductors – gives it asymmetric leverage over Europe’s economic resilience and political sovereignty. If tensions over Taiwan escalate, or if Beijing chooses to retaliate against European policies it deems unfriendly, entire sectors of the European economy could grind to a halt.
Yet unlike the Russian energy crisis, which forced Europe into a reactive – but ultimately decisive – pivot, the looming threat of a China shock has yet to galvanise a unified or proportionate response. The current EU framework, which labels China simultaneously as a ‘partner, competitor, and systemic rival’, reflects institutional hesitation more than strategic clarity. It masks division. It delays action. It invites drift at a moment that demands discipline.
9/12/2025 | Dr. Antonio Nestoras | European Liberal Forum & Friedrich Naumann Foundation
Tech 2030: A Roadmap for Europe-US Tech Cooperation
The United States and Europe confront a common challenge: staying ahead of China in the global innovation race. But the US has moved far ahead in key digital technologies while Europe lags.
The Trump administration recognizes the key role of technology for geopolitical competition. It has made US global leadership on tech and artificial intelligence a core pillar of its national security agenda — most recently in the AI Action Plan. As the US doubles down on tech innovation, Europe risks not just lagging in the short term, but stagnating for the long term.
European decline is not in the US national security interest. The continent remains far and away the US’s largest trade partner, with $1.3 trillion in goods moving across the Atlantic Ocean in 2023, almost 40% more than US trade with China. US investment in Europe and European investment in the US run into the trillions. The US needs a prosperous Europe — its large market, investment, innovation, and talent — to compete with China. US companies benefit from access to the continent’s 450 million consumers, key to the US trade surplus of $71.1 billion in services.
As digital services make up an ever-growing portion of this unparalleled economic partnership, a Europe that lags in tech innovation will be neither economically competitive nor a good trade partner. If Europe can take the hard and necessary steps to accelerate its competitiveness in tech to complement areas where the US lead is already far ahead, it will be a stronger partner to the United States. Growing divergence, however, will only benefit Beijing’s global ambitions to create and control the global tech infrastructure. Going it alone, for either the US or Europe, is simply too high a risk for both.
Europe still has much to offer to the US. European companies will not compete directly with the US on scale, but European researchers and innovators have made significant technological breakthroughs that have benefited US tech growth. A Danish software engineer built Google’s Chrome browser engine, while a Hungarian engineer created Microsoft Office. European talent invented video communications. European companies and research institutes dominate lithography imagery, which is needed to make the most sophisticated semiconductors. Quantum computing? Europeans lead the quantum efforts for several major US players.
09/30/2025 | Center for European Policy Analysis
How 100% Pharmaceutical Tariffs Will Impact Domestic Manufacturing and Supply Chains
A new trade policy from President Donald Trump introduces a significant tariff on imported pharmaceuticals, directly impacting manufacturing strategies and supply chains for companies serving the United States market. This development adds another layer of complexity to an industry already navigating supply chain pressures, regulatory changes, and capital market demands.
In a statement released on Thursday via Truth Social, the president detailed a plan to impose a 100% tariff on all imported branded or patented pharmaceutical products, effective October 1, 2025. This move follows months of discussion around potential sectorial tariffs, with rates previously suggested to be as high as 250% to incentivize domestic production. The president stated his reasoning clearly, noting, “because we want pharmaceuticals made in our country”.
“The details of the 232 tariffs on pharmaceutical products and APIs have yet to be released, but President Trump’s social media post last night indicates that the Department of Commerce is preparing to announce 100% tariffs on what is expected to be a broad swath of drugs and ingredients,” adds Jason Waite, international trade lead at Alston & Bird.
The policy includes a critical provision for pharmaceutical developers: the tariff can be avoided if a company has initiated the construction of a manufacturing facility within the US. “There will, therefore, be no Tariff on these Pharmaceutical Products if construction has started,” the president wrote. In other words, as Waite states, “Significantly, it appears as if generic drugs may escape the tariffs, and that companies building plants in the United States may enjoy some form of exemption.” This ultimatum to onshore production presents a pivotal challenge for industry leaders, from those managing outsourcing and supply chains to executives making long-term capital investment decisions.
It remains unclear if this new 100% rate will be applied in addition to a previously announced 15% tariff on pharmaceuticals imported from the European Union. This lack of clarity introduces further uncertainty for global manufacturing and logistics planning. Indeed, Waite points out that “there are many questions about exactly how companies will be able to avail themselves of [the aforementioned] exemption, but, overall, the President’s announcement suggests a recognition of the complexities of the pharma market and manufacturing, and the impending emergence of a novel tariff regime intended to meet some of the challenges that industry has brought to the Administration’s attention over the past five months.”
09/26/2025 | Christopher Cole | PharmTech
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