US Further Perspective on WTO Reform

The following communication, dated 20 March 2026, is being circulated at the request of the delegation of the United States.

In December 2025, the United States submitted a paper at the World Trade Organization (WTO) entitled “On WTO Reform” (“December 2025 Report”) (WT/GC/W/984).

1. The December 2025 Report, intended to further long-standing discussions on WTO reform, addressed the three reform topics encompassed within the WTO reform facilitator process-decision-making, special and differential treatment (SDT), and level playing field-and three additional topics not included in the facilitator process that, in the view of the United States, warrant discussion: the application of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle, the role of the Secretariat, and essential security. The December 2025 Report also discussed problems affecting international trade that the WTO cannot address, including: imbalances; overcapacity and overconcentration of production; economic security; and supply chain resilience.

2. As United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer has noted elsewhere, the current global order in international trade, overseen by the WTO, is untenable and unsustainable, and the objective of the United States in submitting the December 2025 Report was to spur candid discussions about the WTO’s problems and limitations and to facilitate work with likeminded partners to address these issues.2

3. The United States was gratified that the issuance of the December 2025 Report was not only favorably received, but also prompted other Members to submit papers and other communications that set forth their views on certain of these topics and other related topics. For example: On 21 January, the European Union (EU) submitted a communication (WT/GC/W/986) (“EU Report”) that diagnosed the root causes of the crisis at the WTO as the growing mismatch between WTO rules and today’s trade environment, geopolitical tensions, the weaponization of trade, far-reaching and impactful State intervention leading to systemic imbalances and overcapacities, and paralyzed decision-making. On 6 February, Paraguay submitted a communication (WT/GC/W/987) stating that reform work should focus on institutional topics such as plurilateral initiatives, SDT, dispute settlement, fairness, the WTO budget, and the Secretariat’s external relations. On 18 February, China submitted a communication (WT/GC/W/989) that focused decision-making, development, and fairness.

4. This exchange of papers shows the strength of a growing Member-driven conversation on reform. Such a conversation is both healthy and necessary if the WTO is to be relevant and meaningfully contribute as the world transitions to a new economic order premised on reciprocity and balance and oriented toward serving concrete national interests. In order to give impetus to this discussion, both at MC14 and after MC14, the United States believes it would be helpful to set forth additional views regarding issues discussed in its December 2025 Report and the various subsequent reports submitted by other Members. For each of these issues, we offer additional context regarding the nature or scope of the issue as well as suggestions for a potential way forward. In doing so, we recognize certain topics have been thoroughly debated for years and are ripe for discussion of solutions, whereas other topics may not be ripe for discussion of solutions but nevertheless would benefit from an open-minded exchange of views among Members. 5. We summarize our views on the issues here, and address them in greater length below.

• The United States believes WTO Members can take a step toward leveling the playing field by significantly strengthening incentives to comply with existing obligations to submit notifications.
• The United States believes that Members should seek to restore the purpose of SDT by agreeing to objective criteria for determining eligibility. • The United States believes efforts should focus on finding a more flexible pathway to incorporate plurilateral agreements into the WTO architecture.
• The United States believes Members need to rethink how the MFN principle functions in its current form and embark on a frank discussion of the link between MFN and reciprocity, which itself is a bedrock WTO founding principle.
• The United States believes that Members should address the role of the Secretariat and consider issuing guidance or taking other actions to ensure the Secretariat serves the interests of the Members—and not of the institution or any abstract trading “system.”
• With regard to essential security, the United States believes that Members should agree to an authoritative interpretation of Article XXI of the GATT 1994, Article XIV bis of the GATS, and Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement, to clarify the understanding of the essential security exception.