WITA’s Friday Exchange Podcast: UK Pharma Deal, Future US Tariff Policy, and Chlorinated Chicken
This week on WITA’s Friday Exchange, former trade negotiators discussed the recent US-UK pharmaceuticals deal, shifting US-China trade dynamics in Southeast Asia, as well as a review of tariff policy this year and what’s to come next year.
Featured Speakers:
Introduction: Kenneth Levinson, CEO, WITA – The International Trade Membership Association
Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; former Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Mark Linscott, Senior Advisor, The Asia Group; Senior Advisor, U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Forum; former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for South and Central Asia, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for WTO and Multilateral Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Daniel Mullaney, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Europe and the Middle East, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Moderator: Joe Damond, Chair of International Trade Policy and Global Life Sciences, Crowell Global Advisors; former Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Asia and Pacific, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Watch the Video on YouTube | Listen on Spotify or Apple Podcasts
Defending American Tech in Global Markets
Rob Atkinson, one of the authors of this paper, will be a featured speaker at WITA’s Trade & Technology Summit on Monday, December 8. Information on the Summit can be found here.
In 2024 alone, the European Union imposed $6.7 billion in fines on American technology companies, an amount equivalent to nearly 20 percent of what the EU collected in tariff revenue, demonstrating how regulatory fines have become a significant revenue extraction mechanism. Over 80 percent of fines collected under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Europe’s comprehensive privacy law, have been issued against U.S. firms. This pattern extends beyond Europe: American tech companies have faced fines totaling more than $30 billion globally over the past decade for antitrust or data protection issues. Yet, fines are just one weapon in an expanding arsenal: governments worldwide now deploy discriminatory policies, such as digital services taxes (DSTs), forced data localization mandates and technology transfers, and operational restrictions that constrain American companies’ innovation capacity.
These measures constitute a new category of trade weapon: non-tariff attacks (NTAs). Unlike tariffs or conventional barriers that limit market access, NTAs erode the global competitiveness of targeted firms through regulatory fines, DSTs, forced localization requirements, and operational constraints. They are framed as legitimate domestic policies, but their function is to weaken American technology leadership in favor of domestic champions.
The impact extends beyond individual companies. NTAs undermine U.S. competitiveness and national security in two ways: They displace American firms and reduce market share, harming U.S. jobs and the U.S. trade balance, and they divert capital from research and development (R&D) into fines, localization, and compliance. A single €2.4 billion ($2.79 billion) penalty is equivalent to Google’s entire investment in a major Indiana data center. When compliance costs divert tens of billions of dollars annually from R&D, the drag on innovation becomes clear.
Read the Full Report Here
12/01/2025 | Robert D. Atkinson & Hilal Aka | Information Technology & Innovation Foundation
From Strategy to Doctrine: The Next Steps for European Economic Security
The European Union’s economic security strategy was initially developed at a time of close transatlantic cooperation and focused largely on risks linked to Chinese dominance of certain parts of global manufacturing. However, given the diminished commitment of the United States to its traditional alliances and to multilateral rules, EU economic-security planning now also needs to take into account the risk of US coercive action.
The EU must combine a medium-term strategy to reduce dependencies on both China and the US in critical areas with the capacity to react in the short term to threats of coercion. This requires supply chain chokepoints to be identified. There should also be a political discussion with EU countries on the circumstances in which the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument should be deployed, and the appropriate measures to respond to coercion.
The EU’s various tools for responding to urgent threats to its economic security need to be adapted to the new geopolitical context. The EU should prioritise support for research and development in relation to critical technologies and should ensure a more targeted and effective approach to state aid. It should avoid ‘buy Europe’ policies that contradict its international commitments and limit the scope for partnering with third countries.
On traditional economic-statecraft tools, screening of foreign investment needs to be transformed to responding more effectively to economic-security threats, while export controls need to be better coordinated. Given the need to de-risk relationships with both the US and China, strengthening economic partnerships has become ever more important. Moreover, more robust governance structures to manage the use of economic-security tools and partnerships with like-minded countries internationally need to be developed.
Read the Full Report Here
12/02/2025 | Ignacio García & Bercero Niclas Poitiers | Bruegel
Beyond America First
Countries in the Global South increasingly view President Trump’s “America First” foreign economic policies as both a coercive force and a catalyst for greater economic autonomy. For more than half a century, economic development in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia has been constrained by austerity conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, by punitive debt collection policies pursued by commercial banks and hedge funds backed by U.S. law, and by trade deals that stunt their ability to develop economically. In that respect, Trump’s tariffs are only an intensification of terms of engagement that do severe damage to developing nations.
The prospect of greater South-South collaboration is one of the few bright spots in a generally bleak global picture. South-South trade has been expanding rapidly and thus offers important leverage and opportunities. If we include trade with China, the major engine of such trade, South-South trade represents 55.6 percent of world trade versus 38.3 percent in 1995. Excluding China, it is today 39.6 percent of global trade versus 31.5 percent in 1995.
“Since the financial crisis of 2008, countries in the Global South have increasingly questioned the legitimacy of a U.S.-led international economic order.”
The international financial and monetary system has long been structurally biased against countries in the Global South. For example, in the 1970s, the OPEC oil price increases were extremely costly for Latin America. The basic problem was the strategy of “recycling” the surpluses of OPEC nations, whereby they deposited their profits in U.S. and other international banks, which in turn lent the money to Latin American countries. This scheme bought some time, until the inflation crisis of the mid- and late 1970s led Fed Chair Paul Volcker to raise the Fed rates to 20 percent. Latin America’s interest payments on dollar-denominated debt soared while their currencies plummeted and triggered a massive debt crisis. Countries were then made to pursue perverse austerity policies as a condition of IMF credits and rollovers of private bank lending. This led to a lost decade of growth and worsening livelihoods.
A variation of the same syndrome afflicted Africa. In many countries, debt crises were exacerbated by corrupt deals between local leaders and Western investors. These deals were often financed by debt, but most of the profits ended up in offshore bank accounts. When the leaders were overthrown, the debt stayed on the books of the country and the citizenry, leaving the IMF to come in and impose crippling austerity conditions on debt refinancing.
Much of the Global South is in such a predicament again…
Read the Full Article Here
11/27/2025 | Kevin P. Gallagher & Jose Antonio Ocampo | The American Prospect
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