WITA’s Friday Exchange: Everything Everywhere All at Once, Tariffs as Leverage, and Bespoke Trade Deals
In the latest episode of the Friday Exchange, our former trade negotiators examine the use of tariffs as leverage in trade negotiations, and the significance of deals with Indonesia, Taiwan, Guatemala, El Salvador, and North Macedonia – neglected no more! They also discussed how Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) still helps shape trade policy; the role of WTO disciplines in structuring agreements; and how should we think about trade deficit levels in evaluating success?
Introduction: Kenneth Levinson, CEO, WITA – The International Trade Membership Association
Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; former Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
Everett Eisenstat, Partner, Public Policy Practice Group, Squire Patton Boggs; former Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Deputy Director, National Economic Council in the first Trump Administration; and the former Assistant USTR for the Americas, among other roles.
Daniel Mullaney, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Europe and the Middle East
Chris Padilla, Senior Advisor, Brunswick Group; former Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade
Watch the Video on YouTube | Listen on Spotify or Apple Podcasts
Recorded at 8:45 AM US/ET on 02/20/2026 | WITA
WITA’s WTO Matters Series: Whither MFN – Its Relevance in a Rapidly Changing World
Featured Speakers:
David Henig, UK Director, European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Maria Pagan, former Deputy United States Trade Representative and US Ambassador to the WTO; and Former Deputy General Counsel, Office U.S. Trade Representative, among other position’s she has held.
Dawn Shackleford, President at Looking Glass Trade, LLC; former Executive Director for Trade Agreements Policy & Negotiations, Department of Commerce; former Assistant USTR for WTO & Multilateral Affairs
Alan Wolff, Senior Fellow at Peterson Institute for International Economics ; former Deputy Director-General at the World Trade Organization
Moderator: Angela Ellard, Senior Advisor (non-resident), Center for Strategic and International Studies; former Deputy Director General, World Trade Organization
02/18/2026 | WITA
Prying Open Pandora’s Box by Scrapping MFN
On Wednesday, February 18, WITA hosted Alan Wolff on a webinar that discussed the WTO’s core principle of MFN. Video of that event can be found here.
We are at an odd place with respect to the world trading system right now. Two of the founders of the multilateral system are talking about departing from or at least altering a core obligation of the current system: The United States has stated that the era of the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s basic rule of nondiscrimination – called “MFN,” standing for “most-favored-nation,” is over. The EU Trade Commissioner has called for balance and a rethinking of MFN.
Solely by virtue of its power, the United States has freed itself from the constraints of its most important pledges to the rest of the world’s trading nations—not to exceed tariff levels it committed to through eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (1947 to 1994) and applying the basic rule of nondiscrimination (MFN). The United States imposes whatever tariffs it wishes—to any country and any product. There is no evidence that the European Union has in mind anything as radical but has called into question a basis for the current trading system.
The existing WTO rules have some limited flexibilities with respect to MFN: If members decide to substantially eliminate their tariffs vis-à-vis each other, they are allowed to do so under an exception for free trade agreements (FTAs). They do not have to accord the same largely duty-free treatment to the products of nonparticipants. Whether or not it was intended, use of this exception is far from uncommon. The US-Mexico-Canada FTA is one example.
The current WTO rules do not allow a wholesale rebalancing of tariffs. On the contrary, a key objective contained in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement by which the WTO was founded states that the organization is dedicated to “…entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations….” (emphasis added). These are the world trading system’s two primary anchors: Its members must apply fixed tariffs at agreed levels and without discrimination.
02/17/2026 | Alan Wm. Wolff | Peterson Institute for International Economics
Way Out of The West’s Critical Minerals Dilemma
WITA will host a panel discussing the New Frontier in Critical Minerals Policy at the 2026 Washington International Trade Conference. More information can be found here.
Since 2022, the United States and the EU have shifted rapidly towards a more interventionist industrial policy aimed at building ‘trusted’ critical mineral supply chains free from Chinese inputs.
The logic of this strategy is understandable. China has demonstrated its capacity to exploit supply chain chokepoints and Western defence planners are right to worry about concentrated sources supply for advanced weapons systems.
Yet this Western response exposes a deeper problem. Despite differing policy instruments, Washington and Brussels have pursued two intertwined objectives—national security and competitive positioning vis-a-vis China’s state-led development—risking the subordination of critical minerals that are crucial to managing the challenge of climate change to what amounts to a war-oriented logic.
Policymakers in both the United States and the EU have promoted strategies such as ‘strategic autonomy’, ‘friend-shoring’ and ‘secure supply’ for critical minerals and the industrial capabilities that convert them into batteries, magnets and advanced weapons components. Yet this turn towards state capitalism, with governments acting as direct economic actors, applies the logic of military supply chains to what a climate challenge that can only be met by the mobilisation on market forces across the global economy.
Minerals are classified as critical not only because of their functional importance, but because of their supply chain vulnerability. A mineral may be economically vital yet not deemed to be critical if its supply is diversified across markets and resilient. This differs from strategic minerals, which are defined by their specific utility in defence, aerospace or critical infrastructure and by the absence of viable substitutes. The same minerals, used for both security-sensitive/defence and green technologies, are classified differently across jurisdictions to reflect national security priorities.
02/16/2026 | Marina Yue Zhang | East Asia Forum
U.S.-Taiwan Trade Agreement Leaves Major Questions Open
Taiwan has become only the seventh U.S. trading partner to reach a Reciprocal Trade Agreement with the Trump administration. Under the terms of the deal, the United States will reduce the reciprocal tariff rate on Taiwanese goods to 15 percent, Taiwan will reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers, Taiwanese firms will invest at least $250 billion in the United States for semiconductor production, and Taiwan will guarantee $250 billion in credit for these companies. Taiwan also committed to increasing its purchases of American products, including $44.4 billion of liquefied natural gas and crude oil, $15.2 billion of aircraft and engines, and $25.2 billion of power-generation equipment.
The agreement should help bring much-needed predictability to a critical bilateral economic relationship and foster closer economic ties. At the same time, though, it is unlikely to resolve key issues. America’s trade deficit with Taiwan (the sole rationale for President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs) is set to expand. Differences over the extent to which chip production can and should be relocated to the United States will persist. Questions about Taiwan’s management of its currency, the New Taiwan Dollar (NTD), could grow. The AI boom, while underscoring Taiwan’s importance as a U.S. partner, may also exacerbate concerns about relying too much on the island to help fuel a critical driver of U.S. economic growth.
U.S.-Taiwan Trade Enters a New Era
U.S.-Taiwan trade relations have never been more robust. In 2025, Taiwan was the United States’ fourth-largest trading partner, trailing only Mexico, Canada, and China (in November 2025, the United States traded only $2.5 billion more with China than it did with Taiwan). According to Taiwan’s International Trade Administration, in 2025 Taiwan exported $198.27 billion in goods to the United States, up from $111.4 billion in 2024 (an increase of 78 percent). Taiwan’s exports to the United States have tripled since 2021, and the United States is now Taiwan’s top export destination.
Taiwan’s leading role in semiconductor production and information and communication technology (ICT) goods is largely driving this sharp rise in two-way trade. Taiwanese firms account for 60 percent of all foundry revenue and produce over 90 percent of the most advanced chips, while also exporting other ICT hardware to the United States. If the AI boom continues and the U.S.-China trade war intensifies, Taiwan may leapfrog China and become America’s third-largest trading partner.
02/12/2026 | David Sacks | Council on Foreign Relations
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