WITA’s Friday Exchange: Post IEEPA Tariffs Under Secs. 122, 232 & 301; Waiting on Refunds; and New Legal Challenges
No one understands the dynamics with key U.S. trading partners better than the people who led these kinds of difficult trade negotiations for the United States. Panelists will update our viewers on the trade policy announcements, what remains undone; and what are expected next steps in these trade negotiations.
In the latest episode of the Friday Exchange podcast and video, our trade insiders discuss the uncertainty surrounding tariff policy following the IEEPA ruling, the expiration of Section 122 tariffs this summer, and how Section 301 might take its place. They also examine the durability of current Framework and Agreements on Reciprocal Trade, the potential shift toward more tailored tariff solutions, whether a restoration of the previous tariff regime is possible in a post-IEEPA-tariff world, and what to expect when we’re expecting a China summit.
Introduction: Kenneth Levinson, CEO, WITA – The International Trade Membership Association
Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; former Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, who’s just back from Asia
Ed Gresser, Vice President & Director for Trade & Global Markets, Progressive Policy Institute; author of the Trade Fact of the Week; former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics
Daniel Mullaney, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Europe and the Middle East
Mike Smart, Managing Director, Rock Creek Global Advisors; former Director for International Trade and Investment, National Security Council, The White House; former Trade Counsel, Democratic Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance
Watch the Video on YouTube | Listen on Spotify or Apple Podcasts
Recorded at 9:00 AM US/ET on 03/06/2026 | WITA
WITA’s WTO Matters Series: Trading with Intelligence – Unlocking the Benefits of Digital Trade, AI and Emerging Technologies
Featured Speakers:
Ambassador James Baxter, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the WTO; Co-Convenor of the WTO’s Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce
Christine Bliss, President, Coalition of Services Industries (CSI); former Assistant USTR for Services, Investment, Telecommunication, and E-Commerce
Ambassador Richard Brown, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the WTO, and Facilitator of the WTO’s Work Programme on Electronic Commerce
Johanna Hill, Deputy Director General, World Trade Organization
Moderator: Angela Ellard, Senior Advisor (non-resident), Center for Strategic and International Studies; former Deputy Director General, World Trade Organization
03/05/2026 | WITA
A Deep History of America’s Tariff Wars
It is now ten years since Donald Trump arrived on the American political stage and, whatever one thinks of his style and policies, there is no question that he has turned US politics upside down. One of the most obvious ways, underscored by the Supreme Court’s recent decision to invalidate President Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs, is the way trade policy has become central to American political debate in a way that few imagined possible prior to 2016.
Three decades ago, the debate about trade in America seemed to be over. Convinced protectionists were hard to find, and a broad commitment to trade liberalisation crisscrossed the political spectrum. This was symbolised by the presence of Democrat and Republican former presidents at the official signing into law of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by President Bill Clinton on 8 December 1993. Further liberalisation of trade relations, led by the United States as the world’s sole superpower, seemed unstoppable. The high point, in retrospect, was the decision of the United States to allow China to enter the World Trade Organization in December 2001 and to accord Permanent Normal Trade Relations to the People’s Republic that same year.
There were, however, warning signs that should have indicated that the consensus in favour of free trade was not as solid as most supposed. The most notable such sign was Pat Buchanan’s campaign for the Republican nomination for president in 1992. Buchanan eventually lost to President George H.W. Bush, but his campaign did considerable damage to Bush’s re-election chances and, when combined with a bad economy, helped make Bush a one-term president.
One important feature of Buchanan’s campaign was his unabashed protectionism. According to Buchanan, trade liberalisation had devastated the employment prospects of America’s working class and contributed to the many social problems afflicting that demographic. At one point, Buchanan even claimed that ‘the hidden cost of free trade’ included ‘broken homes, uprooted families, vanished dreams, delinquency, vandalism, [and] crime’. Similar messages came from the Texas oilman billionaire, Ross Perot. He castigated Republicans and Democrats alike for their free trade policies. Perot’s memorable claim that NAFTA’s liberalising of trade between Canada, Mexico and America would mean that ‘you are going to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country’ resonated with some conservatives, but also liberals, even progressives. That message contributed to many Americans voting for Perot in 1992 and 1996, allowing Clinton to enjoy a two-term presidency.
03/02/2026 | Samuel Gregg | Engelsberg Ideas
Are Trump’s “Fallback” Tariffs Legal?
The Supreme Court last week issued a conclusive ruling against President Trump’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs starting in February 2025. In Learning Resources v. Trump, a six-justice majority held that IEEPA does not contain a tariff power. The decision invalidated Trump’s “universal and reciprocal” tariffs, such as his 15 percent tariff on the European Union, South Korea, and Japan, among other countries, as well as his “fentanyl” tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China. The Learning Resources ruling also deprives Trump of the authority to use IEEPA to impose “secondary tariffs” as a geopolitical tool.
President Trump quickly pivoted to reimpose the tariffs under other legal authorities. Within hours of the decision, Trump signed a proclamation under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 imposing a new 10 percent tariff on U.S. imports of many goods. (He subsequently announced on social media that he would raise the rate to 15 percent, although the tariffs came into force at the original 10 percent rate.) Trump’s U.S. Trade Representative (UTSR), Jamieson Greer, issued a statement announcing new investigations under another provision of the same statute, Section 301, which authorizes the USTR to impose tariffs and other restrictions on countries that engage in unfair trade practices. The USTR statement also noted that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 remains in force to impose tariffs on a wide range of products, such as steel and cars.
The Trump administration’s tariff fallback options almost by definition rest on a sounder basis than Trump’s IEEPA tariffs. Unlike IEEPA, which does not contain the word “tariff” and which no previous president had used to impose duties, Trump’s fallback options are tariff statutes that clearly authorize tariffs in at least some circumstances. However, the fallback options all require fact-finding and procedural steps, and/or impose limits on the value of tariffs that can be imposed. As a result, the fallbacks are less flexible than IEEPA prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Learning Resources.
This article unpacks the bounds of Sections 122, 301, and 232 and discusses the potential legal challenges that importers might bring against each of Trump’s primary tariff fallback statutes.
02/25/2026 | Peter Harrell | The Lawfare Institute
The US Dilemma: Necessary, If Not Always Easy
For non-US banks, the conversation has shifted. The central question today is no longer whether international trade and cross-border commerce will continue to grow—albeit perhaps more unevenly and with some fits and starts along the way—but rather how to approach the US market to participate in that growth. Regulatory costs, supervisory complexity and geopolitical uncertainty have made the United States a more difficult—and at times less welcoming—environment for non-US institutions. Even with some softening of regulatory costs under President Donald Trump’s administration, the US is likely to remain one of the more demanding regulatory environments worldwide.
However, while difficulties exist in trading with the US—particularly at the moment—these difficulties should not be confused with decline. As global trade evolves, supply chains digitize, and new payment and financing tools emerge, the US continues to sit at the crossroads of capital, innovation and trust. The real question facing global banks is not whether to step back from the US but how to operate effectively within an increasingly complex environment.
That question turns first on the trajectory of global trade itself.
It may well be that international trade and commerce cool over the next several years, whether due to tariffs or broader geopolitical disruptions. However, personal and institutional connectivity, reinforced by technology and evolving resource needs, makes it unlikely that global trade will diminish meaningfully over the short term and more likely that it will expand over the long term. This does not mean trading patterns won’t change. They have and they will.
03/03/2026 | Eugene A. Ludwig | International Banker
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